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I. INTRODUCTION
For over seventy years, the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") was the principal self-regulatory organization
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("SRO") responsible for the regulation and oversight of the U.S.
securities market.' In 2000, working with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the
NASD initiated a joint investigation into twelve investment firms that
were allegedly "spinning"2 initial public, offerings. 3 This sort of
regulatory interplay between the NASD and the NYSE governed the
industry until 2008, when self-regulatory power was further
consolidated by a merger between the NASD and the regulatory arm
of the NYSE. 4 The resulting organization, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), is now the dominant SRO in the
securities industry.5
Among the twelve firms investigated for spinning, the NASD
oversaw the inquiry into Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB").6 Frank
P. Quattrone, managing director of CSFB's Global Technology Group,
became aware of the investigation in September 2000.7 In December,
Quattrone sent an email that directed his employees "to follow the
firm's document retention policy," apparently a euphemistic
authorization to destroy crucial files.8
The NASD subsequently issued a written request for
Quattrone to appear in an "on-the-record interview." It was clear that
Quattrone would be questioned about his possible obstruction of the
1.
Yesenia Cervantes, "FinRah!". . . A Welcome Change: Why the Merger Was Necessary to
Protect Market Integrity, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 829, 830 (2008).
2.
"Spinning" is a term of art referring to the practice of allocating shares of a hot initial
public offering ("IPO") to the personal accounts of favored clients in the expectation that the
client will resell or "flip" those shares for a profit. Generally speaking, these IPO allocations are
made with the hope that the beneficiaries will return the favor in the form of future business.

See generally Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of FiduciaryDuty or Business
as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002).
3.
Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53547, 87 SEC Docket 1847, at 2 (Mar.
24, 2006), availableat http://perma.cc/X79X-5SK8.
4.
See Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.-FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at http://perma.cc/AK9S-RHLV
(describing how the combined entity is designed to protect investors through regulation,
compliance, and technology-based services). This Note will identify both the NASD and FINRA
as "FINRA" when discussing them in general terms. However, the NASD will be used when
referring to that organization in its particular historical context. See Part III for further
information on the incorporation of FINRA into a private regulatory body.
5.
Id.
6.
Press Release, FINRA, NASD Charges Frank Quattrone with Spinning, Undermining
Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to Cooperate in Investigation (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://perma.cc/Q57C-PDUY.
7.
Id.
8.
Quattrone, supra note 3, at 3.
9.
Press Release, FINRA, NASD Permanently Bars Frank Quattrone from the Sec. Indus.
for Refusal to Testify in NASD Investigation (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://perma.ce/42ZSK558.
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spinning investigation.10 The SEC sent a letter of its own, highlighting
the "joint nature" of the investigation and that "any resolution of the
matter will need to involve all three regulators."" Quattrone declined
the interview on Fifth Amendment grounds, citing a pending criminal
investigation against him for the same misconduct.12 The NASD
charged Quattrone with violating its rules. 13 It rejected his Fifth
Amendment claim, reminding him that "the Fifth Amendment
'restricts only government conduct,' " not private conduct by "a [self-]
regulator." 14 Subsequently, the NASD barred Quattrone from
practicing in the securities market until he appeared for testimony."
The state action doctrine embodies the fundamental principle
that the Constitution only regulates government conduct.' 6
Constitutional claims against a private entity are only valid if the
entity is properly considered a state actor under the doctrine.' 7 Despite
the NASD's terse declaration that it is not a state actor, that
conclusion is far from clear, and NASD's confidence is by no means
shared by courts and scholars.' 8 Certainly, a joint investigation by a
10. While the request did not specifically mention allegations of document destructioninstead, justifying the need for further testimony "to determine whether NASD or federal
securities laws were violated"-the underlying rationale was clear given that the request was
issued the same day as a criminal investigation had been opened by both New York State and
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York on the possible illegal
destruction of CSFB documents. See Quattrone, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that Quattrone's
attorney received phone calls the morning after receiving the request from both offices notifying
him of the criminal investigations).
11. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
12. Id.; see also Press Release, supra note 9 (stating that Quattrone further asserted that
NASD violated its statutory duty to provide him fair opportunity to defend himself).
13. Quattrone, supra note 3, at 3.
14. Press Release, supra note 9 (emphasis added). The NAC highlighted several factorsNASD's incorporation as a private corporation, the absence of any state or federal funding, and
the independence of its Board of Directors from government interference-in finding against
state actor status. Id.
15. Id.
16. There are a handful provisions in the Constitution that do apply to private entities,
such as the 13th Amendment. But these provisions have been interpreted to textually target
private entities.
17. See, e.g., Quattrone, supra note 3, at 11 ("[W]e consider the burden of demonstrating
joint activities sufficient to render NASD a state actor to be high . ..."). The NAC decision was
appealed to the SEC, which decided to remand the case on procedure, but added, in dicta, that
Quattrone's Fifth Amendment assertions will require an analysis of state action doctrine. Id. at
10-11.
18. See, e.g., William I. Friedman, The FourteenthAmendment's Public/PrivateDistinction
Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace-Revisited,23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 727, 731-32 (2004) (attempting to make the argument that while traditionally recognized
state action categories used by the Court would have precluded a finding of state action for
NASD/FINRA, BrentwoodAcademy finally introduced analysis that opened the door to the SRO's
inclusion as a state actor).
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federal agency and a private entity could be state action if a reviewing
court relied on the Supreme Court's latest conception of the doctrine.19
The SEC's letter to Quattrone in February 2003-noting that a
resolution of the investigation would need to involve all three
regulators-is evidence of the type of "entwinement" 20 or "joint
participation" 21 that a court could use to find state action. However,
entwinement and joint participation comprise but a small subset of
the relevant factors. 22
This Note will attempt to show that the ambiguity of FINRA's
status as a state actor is an unfortunate consequence of the
ambiguities in the state action doctrine itself. Given the highly factspecific inquiry of the Supreme Court's state action analysis, the
doctrine is not consistently applied unless a very similar case has
already been reviewed by the Court. 23 However, the Supreme Court
has yet to apply the state action doctrine to an SRO like FINRA.24
Part II of this Note tracks the evolution of the state action
doctrine, mapping the theories that the Supreme Court has used to
demarcate the public/private sphere. This Part emphasizes the
overlapping and contradictory contours of the state action doctrine,
highlighting the arbitrary nature of the various rationales proffered
by the Court.
Part III briefly lays out the history of the NASD and FINRA,
identifying the factors that are most relevant to its state actor status.

19. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)
(introducing the Court's latest conceptual scheme to find state action through "entwinement").
20.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529 n.51

(4th ed. 2011) (discussing the possible interpretations of the use of "entwinement" by the Court
in Brentwood Academy).
21. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924-25, 941 (1982) (highlighting the
joint participation between a private creditor and the county sheriff in attaching the property of
a debtor as a material factor in finding state action).
22. As this Note will demonstrate, while there are traditionally two or three overarching
state action exceptions distilled from Supreme Court cases reaching back to 1883, a myriad of
subfactors, and even a potentially new overarching exception, have been relied upon by the
courts to find for or against state actor status.
23. See Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 221-22 (discussing the
evolution of the doctrine into a factually charged inquiry); see also infra text accompanying notes
50-57.

24. The Supreme Court case concerning the U.S. Olympic Committee in San FranciscoArt
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544-47 (1987) may come
close. The U.S. Olympic Committee was chartered by Congress, regulated by federal law, and
partially federally funded. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 526 (discussing the
characteristics of the Committee).
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Mapping out FINRA's history, structure, and relations with the state
is necessary for a meaningful state action analysis. 25
Part IV highlights the malleability of the current state action
doctrine, by showing that FINRA's status as a state actor can be
switched on and off depending on which facts are emphasized and
which theory of state action is applied. This exercise shows why the
current state action doctrine does not provide adequate guidance for
judges to arrive at consistent results for SROs. Clear and consistent
rules are all the more imperative given the pervasive reach of
governmental collaboration in the private sphere, a condition that is
not expected to decline anytime soon. 26
Finally, Part V attempts to resolve these ambiguities by
introducing a new methodological scheme that will consolidate the
various branches of state action theory under one framework. This
framework is more coherent because it forces an inquiry into the
purposes behind the public/private distinction. In other words, this
new framework relies on the functional need for limiting some private
action through constitutional constraints.
Moreover, the effectiveness of any framework depends on how
well it resolves the state action concerns with FINRA, as well as
whether it can be generally applied to the toughest state action cases.
Otherwise, the new theory will simply be relegated to the grab bag of
state action theories, capable of manipulating facts to arrive at
unpredictable conclusions about the status of a private party. This
Note contends that the framework proposed here could replace the
patchwork of overlapping and contradictory factors that currently
define the state action doctrine.
II. EVOLUTION OF STATE ACTION

The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution governs
only the conduct of the state, while conduct by purely private actors
falls beyond its reach. Courts were able to readily distinguish between
public and private conduct during the nineteenth century, an era of
limited state-provided services. As the state became progressively
25. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 292-93
(2001) (looking at the history, structure, and relationship of the TSSAA with the state).
26. See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy in the American Constitutional Order, 102 POL.
Sci. Q. 217, 217 (1987) (discussing the increasing pervasiveness of American bureaucracy); see
also Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/PrivateDistinction, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("As the public becomes more
private, and the private becomes more public, the contours of the state action doctrine may come
to define the contours of our most basic constitutional rights.").
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involved in private life, however, courts found it difficult to detect that
constitutional threshold. In response, the Supreme Court gradually
expanded its initially straightforward inquiry into the current state
action doctrine, involving a set of theories through which it can bring
certain types of quasi-private activity into the fold of state action.
However, the Court functionally expanded the doctrine without ever
expressly overruling its formalist holdings. This has led to an
unsystematic placement of quasi-private conduct into one of the
several theories falling under the doctrine. Instead of providing
greater consistency, constitutional scholars largely agree that this
approach has created far greater uncertainty. This Part will first
highlight that uncertainty by showing the difficulty courts have in
applying the state action doctrine to FINRA and other SROs. Next, it
will go into greater detail regarding the functionalist expansion of the
doctrine and the theories that currently fall under it.
A. An Inevitable Circuit Split
Given the various doctrinal difficulties underlying the state
action doctrine, 27 FINRA presents a difficult question left unanswered
by the Supreme Court. 28 Some lower courts have shirked the issue
altogether. For example, in a 2011 decision involving a set of
circumstances not unlike the Quattrone case above, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged a circuit split on the issue but left the state
actor status of FINRA undecided. 29
The Second Circuit, in Desiderio v. National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., conducted a cursory analysis of whether
NASD was a state actor, deeming it a private entity for the purposes
of constitutional claims brought against it.30 The court cited a factor
routinely relied upon in the state action analysis by finding that the
"extensive and detailed state regulation" of a business entity does not
convert that organization's actions into those of the state.3 ' The
27. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1255 (noting the struggle of some
commentators to describe "the historical development and continued incoherence of the state
action doctrine . . .).
28. The Supreme Court has not yet taken on the issue of state action in the context of any
self-regulatory organization.
29. See Busacca v. SEC, 449 Fed. App'x 886, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2011).
30. 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999).
31. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)). Jackson was a
Supreme Court case involving the extensive regulation of a utility and concluding that such
regulation alone is insufficient to find state action. However, three separate dissents were filed
in the Jackson case, each proffering compelling arguments for finding state actor status of a
heavily regulated utility enjoying a monopoly in the community. Justice Marshall's dissent
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Seventh Circuit, in Gold v. SEC, faced with the question of whether
the NYSE-another SRO with powers similar to FINRA-is a state
actor concluded 32 that "heavy governmental regulation, by itself, does
not make a private organization into a government actor."3 3
Otherwise, the court added, it "would bring under the Fifth
Amendment much of the private sector, ranging from hospitals to
railroads."34
The Tenth Circuit has simply assumed that the Due Process
Clause applies to enforcement actions of the NASD, sidestepping the
state action analysis altogether.35 Across a range of cases, courts have
characterized SROs such as FINRA as purely private organizations,
quasi-governmental organizations, or organizations engaged in purely
governmental activity. 36 These distinctions are important because
constitutional claims against FINRA are either valid or invalid
depending on which category the SRO falls into.37
The state action doctrine continues to be a highly controversial
standard for analyzing the proper relationship between private actors
and the state. 38 Scholarship on the subject has dwindled in recent
years, in part due to frustration with the current state of affairs. 39
emphasized the operation of a utility as a service "uniquely public in nature" that should be
treated as state action. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 366.
32. The conclusion itself was dicta as the matter had been deemed to be waived on appeal.
See Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the court's doubt about comprehensive
regulation of securities exchanges by the federal government turning exchanges into government
actors).
33. Id.
34. Id. The court did not acknowledge fundamental differences between hospitals or
railroads and a self-regulatory body that enjoyed a near-monopoly and extensive collaboration
with federal agencies for engaging in purely regulatory enforcement activities.
35. See Handley Inv. Co. v. SEC, 354 F.2d 64, 66 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding the
requirements of procedural due process were fully met with regard the application of the NASD
rules); Rooms v. SEC, 444 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that due process
requirements apply to the NASD).

36.

See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory OrganizationsBe

Considered Government Agencies? 2 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Accepted Paper Series,
Paper No. 86, 2008) (describing the variance among courts and cases).
37. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-13 (1883) (committing the state action
doctrine to the public-private distinction).

38.

See Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherenceof Modern State Action Doctrine,28

ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683, 732-34 (1984) (noting that there is significant pressure to use case-by-case
discretion to facilitate the unique fact patters that arise in each case); Ronna Greff Schneider,

State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An HistoricalApproach, 37 FLA. L. REV. 737, 739-43
(1985) (explaining the influence of racial discrimination cases on the expansive view of the courts
toward state action). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 248 (1985)
(asserting that claims of inconsistency in state action doctrine are greatly exaggerated).
39. Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1250 (noting the "lull in scholarly
engagement with the doctrine-perhaps out of sheer frustration . . ."). This Note attempts to
temper any exaggerated claims of inconsistency by actually applying the various categories of
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Some scholars who have ventured to analyze the doctrine pose various
theories to explain its evolution (or lack thereof), relying on both
formal and functional prescriptions. 4 0 Other scholars have tried to find
social, philosophical, and other theoretical explanations for the
doctrine's development. 41
As a result, the disarray in the state action doctrine today
explains the inability of lower courts to apply it uniformly to SROs.
Courts have failed to find a consistent formula for evaluating the
enforcement actions of FINRA42 and, as a result, have refrained from
engaging in anything but a perfunctory state action analysis. 43 The
mechanical inquiry of the current state action doctrine, involving the
indiscriminate cherry picking of facts surrounding the challenged
action and the theories related to the doctrine, often gives courts a
degree of unworthy self-assurance.44 The next Section explains the
historical development of the state action doctrine to clarify just how
the current doctrinal inconsistencies became a reality.
B. A Rationalefor the Doctrine
As early as 1883, the Supreme Court laid down the basic
framework that has governed the state action doctrine ever since.45 In
The Civil Rights Cases, Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1875 under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment
to bar racial discrimination by certain types of private individuals and
organizations. 46 The Court invalidated Congress's application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to private behavior by making a core

the doctrine to the case of FINRA in a reasonable manner in order to show just how unreliable
state action can be.
40. See generally id. at 1251-52 (providing an overview of the various theories proffered to
explain state action precedent).
41. See id. (crediting Professor Kennedy for helping frame this argument).
42. For example, courts have almost always found that qualified immunity should apply to
NASD/FINRA, out of practical concerns that the regulatory functions of the organization would
be inappropriately hindered otherwise. Karmel, supra note 36, at 32.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
44. To date, the Eleventh Circuit is the only Court of Appeals that has acknowledged a
circuit split concerning the application of state action doctrine to SROs and refrained from
undergoing an analysis altogether.
45. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883):
[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or
agents has been taken, . . . no legislation of the United States under [the Fourteenth
A]mendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity,
for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under
State authority.
46. Id.
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distinction between "state action" and "private action." 4 7 This
distinction rested not only on a textual understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment but also on the fundamental need to limit the
reach of constitutional prohibitions into private conduct.4 8
Constructing a clear boundary between public and private conduct
was an important goal for the Court because it prevents
overenforcement of the Constitution in the private sphere.49
The Civil Rights Cases were hardly the end of the matter as it
became clear that the increasing incursions of the state into the
private sphere would require a functionalist expansion of the doctrine
from its formal beginnings.50 The thrust of this expansion took place in
the latter half of the twentieth century, after the New Deal's
administrative state had become firmly ensconced as a new and
pervasive form of state involvement in private activity at both the
federal and state level.5 1
As a result, the Court began to engage in an increasingly factbased analysis, defining the contours of the state action doctrine on a
case-by-case basis. 52 For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Court
found that a privately owned town was a state actor because the
"town" looked very much like a place that was traditionally
administered by the government. 53 Later, in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, a privately owned mall was found not to be a state
actor because, in comparison to the town in Marsh, the mall did not
really engage in traditional public functions. 54
However, rather than developing a universal framework that
would enable a court to determine, in binary terms, whether state
action was present, the Court began to establish a number of
imprecise and overlapping rationales to accommodate a wide range of
constitutional claims and actors.55 Consequently, each new case
47. Id.
48. See John Dorsett Niles et al., Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
885, 886 (2011) (noting that the public-private distinction is what "fundamental[ly] ... defines
the Constitution's reach").
49. With the exception of the 13th Amendment (since the 1960s), the provisions of the Bill
of Rights and the Civil Rights Amendments have been understood to proscribe government
conduct.
50. Developments in the Law, supranote 26, at 1258.
51. Rourke, supra note 26, at 218 (highlighting the pervasive nature of the American
administrative state since World War II); see also Katherine Baicker et al, The Rise of the States:
U.S. FiscalDecentralizationof the PostwarPeriod, 96 J. PUB. EcoN. 1079, 1080-82 (2012).
52. Niles et al., supra note 48, at 886.
53. 326 U.S. 501, 502-06 (1946).
54. 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980).
55. Niles et al., supra note 48, at 886.
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required courts to fit contemporary fact patterns into one of the
increasingly blurry categories of prior precedent. This method resulted
in a "jumbled" analytical framework that is quite unpredictable,
despite the importance of the constitutional question.56 This history
explains the current condition of the state action doctrine, an
increasingly flexible (and thus arbitrary) determination that must be
applied to new forms of quasi-private/quasi-public activities.5 7
The Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have attempted
to classify the state action cases into three broad groupings.
Understanding these categories and their underlying themes is an
important first step to rebuilding a more unified state action doctrine
and to determining the status of FINRA.
C. Three Categoriesof State Action
When evaluating a particular state action question, the Court
often classifies the relevant conduct under one of three generally
accepted categories: (i) the public function theory, (ii) the nexus
theory, and (iii) the joint participation theory.58 It is important to note
that these theories reflect not only the various types of private activity
that have come before the Court, but also the distinct philosophies of
the Supreme Court Justices.59
1. Public Function Theory
The public function approach asks whether the activity
performed by the private party has been traditionally and exclusively
governmental in nature. 60 A private enterprise, carrying out
something that is historically considered a public function, is more
likely to be counted as a state actor. 61 The Court limits what can be
56. Id.
57. See infra Part IV (providing an analysis of the Court's three approaches to the state
action doctrine).
58. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 735 (explaining the different types of philosophies of
the Justices as to what constitutes state action). Many commentators will only consider two
categories-the public function theory and the nexus theory-while others have found another
category through Brentwood Academy, titling it the "entwinement" theory.
59. See id. (explaining the Justices' different philosophies as to what constitutes state
action); see also Glennon & Nowak, supra note 23, at 222 (detailing different state action
philosophies).
60. See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (articulating the public function
approach); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (same); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966) (same); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (same); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (same); see also Friedman, supra note 18, at 736 (same).
61. Friedman, supra note 18, at 736.
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considered a public function by imposing an exclusivity requirement. 62
Thus, conduct that might ordinarily be perceived as governmental in
nature may not be state action if the Court can identify historical
examples where private bodies have delivered the same service. 63
For example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,64 a
privately owned utility, licensed and regulated by the state, was held
not to be performing a public function because at least some utilities
had been private in the past.65 The Jackson Court also rejected the
argument that substantial regulation by the state-a common feature
of non-public utilities-was sufficient to characterize the activity as
public in nature.66 Nevertheless, a dissent by Justice Marshall agreed
that, while heavy regulation was not sufficient to find state action, the
operation of a utility was "uniquely public in nature" because the state
either inevitably provides the service or so substantially regulates it
that the private entity has essentially "surrender[ed] many of the
prerogatives normally associated with private enterprise."67 This
nuanced tug-and-pull regarding what should constitute "public" is a
common feature of this category of the state action doctrine.
Two other areas where the Court has applied the public
function theory are the regulation of schools 68 and the
misappropriation of the electoral process. 69 In National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,the Court held that the NCAA was
a private organization when it required the University of Nevada to
62. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (limiting the public function theory by adding an exclusivity
requirement to the private activity in question); see also Friedman, supra note 18, at 736 (stating
that the public function approach requires private party activity to be exclusively reserved to the
states).
63. It is unclear what degree of historical or contemporary private involvement is needed to
be relevant to the analysis except that the Jackson Court noted that the function must be
traditionally and exclusively performed by the government. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 532.
Dissenting opinions often reject the rigidity of the exclusivity function if the public nature of the
private activity seems to intuitively be the correct answer-either due to monopolies, heavy
regulation, or the prevalence of government's historical involvement. See generally Thomas G.
Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1976) (providing a
detailed analysis of the state action theory).
64. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354.
65. Id. at 353; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 531.
66. Id. at 366.
67. Id. at 372.
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 537 (detailing the Court's consideration of whether
a private entity regulating schools is a public function). See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 180-82 (1988) (holding that the NCAA did not have to provide due process before it
suspended the basketball coach at a state university); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843
(1982) (holding that there was no state action when a private school, which received a majority of
its funding from the government, fired a teacher because of her speech).
69. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462-63 (1953).
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suspend its basketball coach. 70 The Court viewed the regulation of
collegiate athletics as falling outside the "traditional ... [and]
exclusive" function of the state. 7 ' Moreover, in a subsequent caseBrentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association-the Court referred back to Tarkanianand noted that any
influence that a state school had on the NCAA was too diffuse,
stressing that "NCAA policies were shaped not by the University of
Nevada alone, but by several hundred member institutions, most of
them having no connection with Nevada." 72
In Terry v. Adams, the Jaybird Democratic Association, a
private entity composed of registered Democrats, excluded African
Americans from participating in its straw poll. 7 3 The candidate chosen
by the group nearly always won the official Democratic primary. 74 The
Jaybirds contended that they were a private club and therefore
exempt from the complained constitutional violation.75 The Court
disagreed, holding that the regulation and supervision of a public
election were traditionally and exclusively the province of the
government.76 Second, the Court took a functional approach by
highlighting the monopoly-like control that the Jaybird poll had on the
outcome of the public electoral process.77 The Jaybird poll had become
"an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective
process."78 Thus, the Court was willing to extend constitutional
protections into the private sphere when the private activity
misappropriated a characteristically public function.79

70.
Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 182.
71. Id. at 203 n.18. The Court relied on an earlier case, San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987), which had declared that "neither
the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional government function."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 537.
72.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 538. Unlike the Tarkanian case, in Brentwood, the
Court did find state action of a state inter-school athletic association in part because the vast
majority of its members were state schools and they all fell under one state jurisdiction.
73.
Terry, 345 U.S. at 463.
74. Id.
75. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 536.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. It is worth noting that evidence of intent by the state to shift the electoral process onto
the private sphere in order to avoid constitutionally mandated integration of the primaries likely
played a role in the outcome of Terry v. Adams. Id. The possibility of intent as yet another covert
factor in state action analysis simply adds to the thrust of this Note's argument.
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2. Nexus Theory
The nexus theory requires "a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity, so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."0
This theory focuses on the conduct of the government, rather than the
type of private activity being challenged. Under the nexus theory, the
Court looks to whether the government has authorized, significantly
encouraged, or facilitated the private conduct.81 Analytically, the
Court considers "points of contact" between the state and the private
entity, finding state action when there is a high degree of
involvement. 82
In Blum v. Yaretsky, a class of Medicaid patients claimed that
decisions made by private nursing homes to transfer them to facilities
offering less extensive services constituted state action. 83 The litigants
alleged that the government imposed pervasive funding requirements
on the nursing homes, which caused the transfer decisions. 84 For
example, state policy required private medical facilities to create
"utilization review committees" to determine the level of care needed
for each patient.85 The state reserved the right to adjust funding if the
review committee suggested transferring eligible patients to a less
expensive facility and the facility refused.86 Given that over ninety
percent of the patients were funded by Medicaid, a fairly strong
argument could be made that the state's rules "significantly
encouraged" the private nursing homes to transfer eligible patients.87
However, the Court held that because the review committees
exercised some degree of medical discretion, the state's rules were not
sufficient to label the nursing homes state actors.88
Nevertheless, there are instances where regulations or
licensing schemes can be so coercive that the regulated entities might

80. Friedman, supranote 18, at 735-36.
81. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 539.
82. Friedman, supranote 18, at 736 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
83. See Blum, 457 U.S.at 993-94 (explaining the factual background of the case); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 548 (summarizing the Medicaid patients' argument). The state
conditioned its Medicaid funding on a rigid framework of state mandated rules.
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 548.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. In making the ruling, the Court still reaffirmed the nexus theory by noting that
state action may be found if "[the State] has exercised such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must . . . be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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be viewed as state actors. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the Lodge
was a private club that restricted membership to whites. 89 This
racially restrictive policy was enshrined in the club's charter. 90 An
African American guest who was denied access contended that there
was state action because the state had granted the Lodge a number of
liquor licenses and thus endorsed the club's discrimination policy. 9 1
The Court predictably held that mere state licensing is insufficient to
find state action. 92
The Court did, however, strike down a provision of the
licensing regulations that threatened to terminate a liquor license
based on violations of an entity's charter provisions.93 The Lodge was
willing to ignore its racially restrictive charter policy, but it feared
losing its liquor license under the licensing regulation. Apparently, the
Court was reluctant to go so far as to allow states to force parties to
engage in racial discrimination. Hence, the Court created an exception
to the state action doctrine in this narrow instance. 94
3. Joint Participation Theory
The final approach under the state action doctrine is the joint
participation theory.95 This theory is arguably a variant of the nexus
theory because it measures state involvement based on the extent to
which the private party and the state have jointly participated in the
questioned activity. Three prominent Supreme Court cases have
applied the joint participation theory, albeit in different ways: Lugar
v. Edmonson,96 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,97 and
Brentwood Academy.98
89.

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972).

90.
91.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 163.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 163-64.

94. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948). Shelly is also often viewed as a narrow
departure from finding judicial enforcement insufficient for state action since the private conduct
in question involved a racially restrictive covenant and parties who were willing to break it but
for the court's enforcement. Id.
95. Friedman, supra note 18, at 735-36. Many commentators have folded state action cases
characterized as joint participation into a broader interpretation of the nexus theory.
96. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982) (providing a formula for
determining "fair attribution").
97. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) ("It cannot be
doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is
located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits.").
98. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001)
('The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement
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In Lugar v. Edrnonson, the Court applied a two-part test for
determining state action that asks: (i) whether there was a
deprivation of a right or privilege created by the state, or a deprivation
caused by a person for whom the state is responsible; and (ii) whether
the party charged with the deprivation is a state actor "because he is a
state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State."99
Notwithstanding Lugar's two-part test, Burton is perhaps the
most well-known case applying the joint participation theory.100 The
case involved a government lease to a privately owned restaurant
operating in a government-owned parking building.10 ' The
restaurant's racially discriminatory policies, neither prohibited by the
state nor barred by the lease, were challenged as unconstitutional.102
The Court concluded that state action was present by relying heavily
on the fact that the state relied on income from the lease to
successfully operate the parking building. 03 Because of this "symbiotic
relationship," the city had an affirmative obligation to include a nondiscrimination clause in its lease with the private entity. 104
Finally, the Court's 2001 Brentwood Academy decision
broadened the joint participation theory, finding that a private entity
in charge of regulating and supervising interscholastic athletics in
Tennessee was a state actor based on the government's "entwinement"
with its activities. 105 Because the Court did not precisely define the
contours of "entwinement" or the degree to which the state needs to be
involved, the reach of the Court's decision remains unclear. The Court
of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no
substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it.").
99. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 923 (providing a formula for determining "fair attribution").
100. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (holding that the exclusion of an individual solely based on
race from a restaurant operated by a private owner under lease in a building financed by public
funds and owned by the parking authority was discriminatory state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause). Id. It should be noted that the categorization of Burton under "joint
participation" is not a universal practice. Other commentators have placed the case under the
public function approach (Chemerinsky, for example) or a separately identified "symbiotic" subcategory of the nexus theory. Indeed, an easily identified consensus does not exist with respect to
much of the categories delineated in this Note, and many of the cases could overlap or blur into
other categories. This observation merely strengthens claims against the viability of current
state action doctrine. Nevertheless, care has been taken to track the categories above to as close
to the median understanding in scholarship as is possible.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 288 (2001).
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justified its conclusion by simply emphasizing the relationship
between the association and the government.106 Moreover, whether
entwinement is a new variant of a preexisting theory remains unclear.
Before applying the Court's three state action theories to
FINRA, it is crucial to understand SROs and their history of selfregulation. This understanding is important because several factors
play a role in determining whether an entity is a state actor, including
history, governance structures, public perception, congressional
judgment, customary practices, and others.
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF SELF-REGULATION

Self-regulation has been ubiquitous in the securities industry
since brokers in New York formed the first organized stock market in
1792.107 Private conventions within the industry developed before
federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930s, and many of the
important concepts that were subsumed into federal law originated
from self-regulation practices in the pre-Depression Era. 108 Today,
while a variety of public and private regulatory institutions preside
over the national securities market, 109 FINRA is the largest noncommercial self-regulatory authority in the United States.110 The
Association regulates almost every securities broker-dealer in the
industry, and most dealers are statutorily required to become FINRA
members.'11 This Part briefly tracks the initial formation of SROs in
the securities industry, their subsequent integration into federal
106. For example, eighty-four percent of its members were public schools; there was
evidence that the state had traditionally delegated regulation of interscholastic athletics to the
private entity; most of its funding was derived from member public schools; most of its meetings
were held on government property; and the government appointed non-voting members of the
private entity's committees. Id. Thus, the Court found significant government involvement
without offering a standard through which the degree of involvement appropriate to find state
action could be determined. Id. This is not surprising since a case-by-case analysis of whether
state action is present will invariably result in a patchwork of criteria based on facts often too
difficult to reconcile.
107. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700,
17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://perma.cc/8FDM-PW5R.
108. Karmel, supra note 36, at 3; see also SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation,
supranote 107 (discussing the foundations of the self-regulatory system).
109. Such as privately operated national exchanges.

110. Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities SelfRegulation: It's Time to End FINRA's Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 136
(2011).
1l1.
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(8) (2012); see also
Orenbach, supra note 110, at 136 ("FINRA regulates virtually every securities broker-dealer that
conducts business in the United States, most of which are required by statute to be a FINRA
member.").
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statutory regulations, and the eventual establishment of FINRA as a
consolidated self-regulatory entity.
The foundation for today's financial regulatory model is rooted
in the failure of unfettered self-regulation during the Depression
Era. 112 Congress eventually recognized that rampant "manipulative
and speculative" trading behavior was going largely unchecked.113
Initially, reform was targeted at the NYSE through the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.114 Rather than usurp the Exchange's wellestablished tradition of self-regulation, Congress reached a
compromise, whereby a "structure of public governance" was
statutorily imposed over the Exchange, transforming it from a private
club to a government-supervised SRO. 15 Under the supervision of the
newly founded SEC, the federal government empowered the NYSE to
employ its expertise in regulating the securities markets.116
The public/private compromise of the Exchange Act
emphasized a congressional commitment to self-regulation as the
primary means of controlling the industry. Self-regulation was a
"mutually beneficial balance" between the interests of the government
and the industry.117 It was meant to achieve an efficient regulatory
regime, combining the SROs' familiarity with the complexities of the
industry with the SEC's ability to provide oversight and ensure overall
compliance. 18 Moreover, because member firms provided the funding
for the SROs, the government could use its resources towards other
regulatory initiatives. 119
In 1938, the Maloney Act provided a self-regulatory framework
for the over-the-counter ("OTC")120 securities market by giving legal
status to FINRA's precursor, the NASD-an already existing
voluntary group of broker-dealers.121 During its initial history, the
NASD remained largely "member-centric," in control of its own

112. Friedman, supranote 18, at 738-39.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The authority included the power to regulate, subpoena, and call certain members
for hearings.
117. Id. at 740.
118. Id. at 741.
119. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107.
120. The private alternative to the public market exchanges regulated by the Exchange Act.
121. The existing group of broker dealers formed a private organization, the Investment
Banker's Conference. STEVEN LOFCHIE & MOISES MESSULAN,

CADWALADER WICKERSHAM &

TAFT, SECURITIES SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (on file with author).
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governance, and dedicated to the interests of the industry. 122 The
Maloney Act made membership voluntary and incentive-based.123
However, in 1975, amendments tightened the SEC's control over the
NASD and other SROs.124 The amendments also reaffirmed a
preference for the self-regulatory model, emphasizing "the sheer
ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly through
the government on a wide scale." 1 25
The most invasive function of the 1975 amendments was the
grant of authority to the SEC to modify NASD rules as it deemed
necessary and to require the NASD to adopt any rule issued by the
SEC. 126 The amendments also required SEC approval before any new
SRO rules could issue. 127 Finally, the SEC was given the power to
oversee the governance structure of the NASD, and the amendments
required that a broad swath of stakeholders be represented. 128
At this point, compulsory membership was not a feature of the
SRO model. However, Congress eventually became frustrated with
broker-dealers who were avoiding self-regulation by refusing to join
the NASD, so it amended the Maloney Act in 1983 to impose
compulsory SRO membership.129 This membership mandate seemed
inevitable given the government's prerogative to regulate all corners
of the industry through the SRO model.
Finally, in the event that an SRO does not comply with the
Exchange Act or its amendments, the SEC has the power to impose
sanctions.1 30 Additionally, the SEC can discipline SRO members
directly and commence injunction proceedings for unlawful trading
practices. 31 The amendments have had the effect of greatly
122. Orenbach, supra note 110, at 139. As early as the 1950s, instances of investor
speculation, fraud, and manipulation occurred with "disturbing frequency" on stock exchanges
and the OTC markets. In 1963, the SEC conducted a comprehensive study of the exchange and
OTC markets. It identified lapses in SRO monitoring of those markets and the failure to produce
appropriate standards of conduct. Id. at 145.
123. Lofchie & Messulan, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107; see also S. REP. No.
94-75, at 7 (1975) ("Because of the unique system of self-regulation in the securities industry, the
principal markets for securities, i.e., the exchanges, are also the principal regulators of the
activities of broker-dealers using those markets.").
126. Friedman, supra note 18, at 742.
127. Id.
128. LOFCHIE & MESSULAN, supra note 121.
129. Id.
130. Thus, through the sanction power, the SEC is able to compel an SRO to take action in
compliance with the Exchange Act without any recourse on behalf of the SRO. Friedman, supra
note 18, at 743.
131. Id. at 744.
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broadening the Commission's authority over the NASD (and now
FINRA).
In 2007, the SEC approved a plan to consolidate the NASD and
the regulatory arm of the NYSE in order to synchronize regulatory
rules between the two SROs.1 32 FINRA, the resulting organization,
adopts rules; makes policy pronouncements; examines firms for
compliance; and monitors members' financial solvency, operational
capabilities, and risk assessment practices. FINRA also has an
enforcement arm that investigates members for potential violations of
securities laws and can bring disciplinary proceedings against alleged
violators.
IV. AN APPLICATION OF THE THREE THEORIES
Some courts have confidently asserted that FINRA cannot be a
state actor under the current doctrine. 133 But it is unclear why that
might be the case. As noted above, the state actor status of a private
entity is largely uncertain unless the Supreme Court has heard a case
with similar factual circumstances. Even then, similarity is often in
the eye of the beholder, and points of contact that are significant in
one case have been irrelevant in another. Analogous reasoning-an
inevitable feature of constitutional analysis but an especially
problematic device for state action issues-leads to uncertainty in the
doctrine. This Part attempts to reveal the arbitrariness of the current
state action doctrine.134 Specifically, an application of the three major
theories to FINRA reveals the doctrine's weaknesses by showing that
this SRO could reasonably be considered a private entity or a state
actor under existing precedent.
A. FINRA Under the Public Function Theory
Under the public function approach, FINRA's state actor status
depends on whether its regulatory functions are traditionally and
exclusively governmental. Here, a court could rely on the century-long

132. Lofchie & Messulan, supra note 121.
133. Others have argued that Brentwood Academy finally opened the door for finding state
action in SROs. Thomas K Potter, III & Neely S. Griffith, 'Entwinement'andNASD Enforcement
Proceedings:Reexamining NASD's State-Actor Status in the Post-Brentwood Era, 39 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. 1111 (2007).
134. As a result of the incoherence, commentators have argued for doing away with the state
action threshold and simply determining whether state action is present based on the merits of
the case. Given the unlikelihood of adoption, this Note will not address that possibility.
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history of self-regulation to conclude that SROs, like FINRA, do not
engage in an exclusively public activity.
However, such a conclusion would be a superficial application
of the public function theory. Certainly any foray into the history of
securities regulation should not overlook the transformation that
occurred in the post-War period. An entirely new paradigm has
evolved over the decades, one which Congress and the SEC have
deliberately constructed in response to the apparent failures of
unfettered self-regulation. Transformative leaps in the relationship
between the government and NASD/FINRA have been accompanied
by congressional declarations affirming the unique public necessity of
securities regulation.135 The justification for heightened state
involvement in SROs was largely based on the public importance of
the industry. That justification has become an ever more popular
rationale among lawmakers in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis.13 6 Moreover, while federal involvement might only be a postDepression Era occurrence, state laws have regulated the industry
since its inception."'
The regulatory constraints applied to member firms illustrate
the importance of regulating the securities market. Members must
submit themselves to FINRA's rules and procedures in order to
operate in the industry.138 Additionally, the powers bestowed upon
FINRA have a distinctly governmental character. The organization
can promulgate generally applicable rules, investigate alleged
violations, levy fines, and even ban members from the industry. 39 As
highlighted in the Quattrone case, FINRA looks very much like a
government actor when it exercises these statutory powers.
The courts and commentators who contend that FINRA is not a
actor
have applied the existing public-function cases without
state
fully appreciating the unique status of this organization. Utilities like
the one challenged in Jackson, for example, primarily provide a
service. Their regulatory activities-such as setting prices-are
secondary to that service component. In other words, unlike FINRA

135. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107; see also S. Rep. No.
94-75 (1975) (suggesting that Congress is aware of the public necessity of securities regulation).
136. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 54th Economic Conference (Oct. 23, 2009),
availableat http://perma.cc/H59T-4R7A.
137. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107 ("In its earliest
years, the nascent U.S. securities market was loosely subject to state laws . . . .").
138. See supra note 111 (suggesting that the importance of securities regulation is
demonstrated by membership requirements and regulations of FINRA members).
139. See supraPart I (describing the general authority conveyed to FINRA).
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and the securities market, the state in Jackson had not constructed an
overarching scheme of regulation for the utilities market with several
specific statutes.
Indeed, FINRA's activities could reasonably be analogized to
the Jaybird Democratic Association in Terry v. Adams. There, the
Court's reliance on the public importance of the electoral process
allowed it to extend state action to a private organization despite very
weak evidence of state involvement. The Court viewed the electoral
process as a standard government function. 140 Consequently, it was
irrelevant that the state's ability to control the Jaybird Association, a
private political organization, was limited. 141 Similarly, the regulation
of financial markets, as evidenced by the complex regulatory
framework and congressional demands for a public role, can be
perceived as an exclusively governmental prerogative. Hence, the
mere fact that Congress delegated the regulatory mechanism to a
private entity like FINRA does not mean there is no longer state
action.142 The history of private self-regulation is overcome by the
federal government's interest and heavy involvement in regulating the
securities industry since the Depression.
Nevertheless, many commentators have narrowly construed
Terry v. Adams, emphasizing the public nature of the electoral process
and the fact that the state appeared to be delegating away its
regulatory authority in order to enable discrimination.143 As such,
courts have sometimes relied on the government's intent as a covert
rationale for finding state actor status.144 Yet, even under this limited
construction of Terry, history shows that the government's intent
140. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 532.
141. Id. at 536. It is worth noting that the Court in Terry characterized the Jaybird's
activities as inappropriate state delegation of the electoral process. However, in other cases, the
Court has strictly construed the delegation doctrine, so that any discretion on the part of the
private actor will be enough to nullify the delegation theory. In this case, the Court apparently
viewed the importance of the electoral process as a public function to be outweighed by any
amount of discretion available to the private actor.
142. Certainly the relevant history of NASD/FINRA is one that is characterized by
significant government "guidance" and exploitation of the benefits of the SRO model. The form of
"cooperative regulation," termed by the SEC's first chairman, Joseph Kennedy, had the
advantage of allowing for a less invasive regulation of the industry and permitted a quicker
response to perceived violations than would be possible by a government agency constrained by
due process. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107.
143. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 537 (showing that a narrow reading of the White
Primary Cases is the most reasonable construction, and showing the court's willingness to
engage in functional arguments when there is evidence of intent by the state to delegate state
functions to avoid constitutional limitations).
144. Id. at 532 (arguing that whether the state intended to delegate the governmental
activity precisely to allow constitutional violations is one way of trying to make sense of the
public function theory).

1194

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:4:1173

behind the adoption of the self-regulatory model for the securities
industry was, in part, to avoid constitutional constraints that would
inevitably attach to direct regulation. As articulated by former SEC
Chairman William Douglas, self-regulation, combined with close
supervision by a government agency, allowed the government to take
swift enforcement actions against member firms without the
restraints of due process. 145 Thus, the government's intentions with
FINRA are highly analogous to the regulatory dynamics in Terry v.
Adams.
B. FINRA Under the Nexus Theory
The nexus theory portends even greater uncertainty for a court
trying to place FINRA on either side of the state action divide. In
Blum v. Yaretsky, for example, the Court made it clear that extensive
regulation of the private entity does not itself confer state actor
status. 146 There, the presence of a nexus between the state and the
private entity was mitigated by some level of discretion available to
the nursing home, discretion that the Court characterized as
"independent medical judgment."147
It is unclear how much discretion or what type of discretion
would be enough under Blum, but, whatever the standard, FINRA is
likely a private actor under the nexus theory. The very purpose of the
self-regulatory model that Congress and the SEC adopted is to utilize
the benefits of SRO discretion. 148 Discretion is an inherent feature of
the self-regulatory model, which the government actively sought in
order to free up government resources and utilize SRO expertise.
145. Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market SelfRegulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS.
LAW. 1347, 1361 (2004).
146. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (suggesting that although an
entity acts under the "color of state law," this assignment entails functions and obligations in no
way dependent on state authority . . . [not] dictated by any rule of conduct imposed by the
State"); see also supra text accompanying notes 83-88 (suggesting that the court acted to affirm
the nexus theory).
147. 457 U.S. at 1014. The argument that significant regulation alone is not enough, even
when funding for the private entity is conditioned on the framework of government criteria, is
belied by other cases where partial state government assistance to segregated private schools in
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556
(1974), was sufficient to attach state actor status to those schools. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
20, at 549 (suggesting that Norwood and Gilmore can be distinguished on the ground that the
government gave aid with the intent of undermining school desegregation).
148. William Douglas, Chairman of the SEC, said of the SRO model when the Maloney Act
was being considered in 1938 that "[g]overnment would keep the shotgun ... behind the door,
loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used."
Seligman, supra note 145, at 1361.
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Hence, neither the extent of statutory regulation nor the SEC's active
role in FINRA activities would be sufficient to deem it a state actor
under the nexus theory.
However, like the public function theory, the nexus theory can
also be manipulated to arrive at different results. In Moose Lodge, the
Court invalidated a provision of state law that effectively coerced two
unwilling parties into violating the Constitution. 149 The statute in
question would terminate a private club's liquor license if it violated
any provision of its own charter.150 The lodge wanted to ignore its
racially restrictive policy but was strongly discouraged from doing so
by the regulation. 51 The state's regulation in Moose Lodge-a
generally applicable conditional liquor license-was arguably less
intrusive than the detailed regulations in Blum.152 Hence, it is
reasonable to conclude that it was the coercive nature of the
regulation153 that altered the Court's usual approach under the nexus
theory.
Similarly, FINRA could also fit under the "coercion" rationale
of Moose Lodge because it has a fundamentally coercive relationship
with its members.15 4 By statute, members must abide by the
enforcement proceedings that FINRA brings in order to operate in the
industry.155 The sanctions imposed on Frank Quattrone-a $30,000
fine, one year suspension, and the threat of permanent suspension
from the industry-highlight FINRA's coercive power.15 6 Moreover,
FINRA's activities are mandated by statute and heavily guided by the
SEC. 57 Even though FINRA may possess day-to-day discretionary
149. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94 (providing support from Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis and Shelley v. Kraemer).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
152. In Blum, the regulations were a more direct product of the state's interest in adjusting
its Medicaid funding to nursing facilities. They called for the use of "utilization review
committees," the production of reports to the state for approval, and the power to adjust the
state's Medicaid funding to the nursing facilities. While this Note will later argue that these
facts alone may not be enough to prove the state's "material interest," they should be enough to
show that, compared to Moose Lodge, there is greater involvement by the state in Blum. See
supra text accompanying notes 83-88; see also infra text accompanying notes 193-96.
153. Along with the discriminatory characteristic of the constitutional violation.
154. Again, it should be emphasized that the Court never actually develops a separate
"coercion" theory, but it is clear from the case that the presence of unwilling parties, much as
was the case in Shelly v. Kraemer, plays a role in invalidating the regulatory provision.
155. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(8) (2012); see also
Orenbach, supra note 110, at 136 (providing an overview on FINRA).
156. The appeals process, which gives significant discretion to the SRO and the SEC, is also
irrelevant because the constitutional protection claimed by the plaintiff is itself dependent on
state actor status, trapping the FINRA member into a circular analytical framework.
157. See supra note 111.
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power, the government retains overarching authority,15 8 which
presents a much stronger rationale for state action.15 9
Further illustrating the wide analytical latitude that the nexus
theory provides, many courts focus on the particular activity being
challenged rather than the overall relationship between the private
entity and the state. Courts do this because the Supreme Court has
given no definitive guidance about what level of generality to use
when applying the state action doctrine. In Desidierio v. National
Association of Securities Dealer, Inc.,160 for example, the Second
Circuit engaged in a cursory high-level analysis of the state actor
status of the NASD as an entity, relying on formal conditions such as
its private incorporation and the fact that it received no state or
federal funding.' 6 ' In a brief sentence, it simply cited the Supreme
Court's refrain in Jackson that extensive regulation does not convert a
private organization into the state.162 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
also analyzed the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complained. 63
The complaint alleged that a mandatory arbitration clause contained
in a NASD document unconstitutionally required the plaintiff to
forfeit her Fifth Amendment right to due process.164 Without ruling on
the matter, the Second Circuit applied the nexus theory to the
relationship between the state and the arbitration clause, as opposed
to the relationship between the state and the NASD. 6 Thus, because
of the absence of meaningful Supreme Court guidance, the court in
this instance considered the organization as a whole as well as the
specific violation to determine whether a sufficient nexus was present.

158. Which is evidenced by the ease with which it had encroached itself into NASD and
FINRA on a regular basis.
159. Moreover, even this discretionary activity is ultimately reviewable by the SEC, which
has the power to alter on its own will. FINRA may even be required to implement rules
promulgated at the SEC without any meaningful ability to frustrate the agency intrusion. SEC
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107.
160. 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 206-07. The court cited Blum v. Yaretsky, stating that the case "requires a nexus
between the state and the specific conduct of which [the] plaintiff complains." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Court noted that no SEC rule encouraged the promulgation of the mandatory
arbitration clause, and the requirement that the SEC approve the rule prior to implementation
was not enough to find state action. Id. Had the SEC encouraged the NASD to promulgate the
mandatory arbitration clause, the Second Circuit may have found that state action was present.
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C. FINRA Under the Joint ParticipationTheory
As explained above, the joint participation theory is grounded
in the two-part test from Lugar. Under a narrow reading of that
test,166 the first prong can only be met when the rule in question is
promulgated by the government and has the force of law. 167 The
second prong can only be met when the state is directly involved in
enforcing that law.16 8 Moreover, both prongs suggest that courts
should examine the specific conduct being challenged, not the overall
relationship between the state and the private entity. With FINRA,
the first prong arguably cannot be satisfied since the rules that
regulate the securities market are formally promulgated and
implemented by FINRA, not the SEC. Moreover, the language of the
second prong remains vague enough to satisfy either side of the state
action divide, and the relevant analysis would mirror the arguments
made under the public function theory.
Nevertheless, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority may
provide support for finding that FINRA is a state actor. There, the
state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant." 169 The two key factors for finding state action in Burton
were (i) the financial benefits that the state was receiving from its
lease with the restaurant and (ii) the discretion that the city exercised
in choosing the provisions of the lease, which did not prohibit racial
discrimination.170 Both factors are necessary for a finding of joint
participation under Burton.171 For example, if the second factor alone
was sufficient, almost any private entity licensed by the state would
be deemed a state actor, a possibility already rejected by the Supreme
Court.172

166. Recall that the two-part test requires: (i) a deprivation caused by the exercise of a right
or privilege created by the state or a rule of conduct imposed by the state, or a person for whom
the state is responsible; and (ii) the party charged with the deprivation to be a person who may
be fairly said to be a state actor "because he is a state official, because he has acted together with
or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable
to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923 (1982).
167. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 542.

168. Id.
169. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
170. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 20, at 544-45.

171. See id. (providing further analysis of the Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
decision).
172. See id. Moreover, in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co. a licensing requirement alone
was not enough to find state action.
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Under Burton, a reasonable argument could be made that the
federal government has so far inserted itself into the securities
industry that it must be recognized as a joint participant with FINRA.
A symbiotic relationship between the state and FINRA can be found
on multiple levels. For example, the federal government's deficiencies
in resources and knowledge were a primary rationale for using the
SRO model to regulate the industry when the Maloney Amendment
was enacted in 1938.173 Even after SRO failures prompted the 1975
Amendments, Congress stuck with the self-regulatory model (under
the strict supervision of the SEC) to harness the resources and
expertise of the industry. 174 Moreover, members of FINRA are
required by statute to fund the SRO, providing further evidence that
the government financially benefits from this private entity.175
This symbiotic relationship continues today. In 2003, the
NASD and NYSE had a collective regulatory staff of 2,650 and a
regulatory budget of $642 million.176 The number of staff members at
both SROs was over four times the number in the SEC's Division of
Market Regulation, the branch responsible for overseeing all
securities regulations. 77 The SEC could not directly supervise the
industry without significant added costs. Therefore, depending on how
broadly the Burton case is construed, a court could certainly find that
FINRA is a state actor under the joint participation theory, given its
strong symbiotic relationship with the federal government.
Finally, even if Burton is construed narrowly, 78 the Court's
language in Brentwood Academy leaves open the possibility that a
court could find that there is sufficient "entwinement" between FINRA
and the SEC to constitute state action. 79 The Court used no real
formal standard in Brentwood Academy to determine what may or
may not constitute entwinement. However, a number of factors
suggest that the intensity of state involvement in Brentwood Academy
was much weaker than the level of control that the SEC has over
FINRA. For example, in Brentwood Academy, the state's influence
primarily came from the fact that public high schools comprised a
173. Seligman, supra note 145, at 1361.
174. SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107.
175. Id.

176. Seligman, supra note 145, at 1384.
177. Id.

178. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 544-45 (showing that Burton's rationale has not been
construed broadly).
179. Justice Souter noted that there was no single test for determining state action, but said
that the "facts in this case justified concluding that there was sufficient government
'entwinement' for the Constitution to apply. Id. at 538.
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majority of the association's membership. Additional factors
suggesting entwinement included the indirect funding of the
organization by public schools and the use of public facilities for
organizational meetings.180 There was no other direct involvement
from the state government aside from a Tennessee statute that
recognized the role of the athletic association.181 By almost every
measure, the federal government is much more entwined in the affairs
of FINRA than Tennessee was with the athletic association in
Brentwood Academy. For example, the SEC has a direct, top-down
relationship with FINRA, not the diffuse, member-centric one at issue
in Brentwood. FINRA's funding may not directly come from the state,
but federal law calls for funding to flow from FINRA's private
members. Finally, unlike the limited legislative interaction in
Brentwood, FINRA is a byproduct of multiple legislative commitments
to the SRO model.
By now, it should be clear that the current state action doctrine
should be replaced. The next Part will introduce a new way of
evaluating the state actor status of quasi-private entities such as
FINRA.
V. REBUILDING THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A proper framework for analyzing state action must be
grounded in the rationales for creating a public/private distinction in
the first place.182 The main tension in the development of the state
action doctrine has always been the formal need to maintain a bright
line and the functional desire for a flexible approach that can be
applied to a variety of fact patterns.183 This tension has become
increasingly severe as the line between public and private activity
continues to blur after the Civil Rights Cases.184 Nowhere is this
blurring more evident than in the relationship between the federal
government and FINRA. The informal ways in which the government
can influence or coerce private entities suggest that the state action
doctrine will always exhibit some degree of inconsistency.

180. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 299 (2001).
181. Id. at 292-93.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49 (explaining that the public/private distinction
has been integral to the state action doctrine since its creation).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49 (suggesting that, since the public/private
distinction guards against extending constitutional prohibitions into the private sphere, this
distinction must be adaptable to varying situations).
184. See supra note 26 (citing authorities that discuss this blurring).

1200

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:4:1173

Nevertheless, the doctrine as it currently stands creates untenable
regulatory uncertainty for private parties.
This Part presents a universal framework that squarely
confronts the most common problem under the current state action
doctrine: degree. The public function, nexus, and joint participation
theories have failed to indicate how much activity should be public or
how many points of contact should exist between the state and the
private entity. By employing a methodology that explicitly focuses on
degree, courts could better constrain themselves in their state action
analyses.
A. A Two-Pronged Test
The new framework developed in this Note is meant to
incorporate a semi-formallsemi-functional approach to state action
that mitigates abuses of the private/public distinction while still
maintaining a meaningful separation between the two types of
activities. In order to achieve this goal, a court should ask two key
questions: (i) Is the evidence of the state's but-for material interest in
the private entity sufficient to characterize the private conduct as
state action? (ii) Is the state's level of control over the injured claimant
sufficient to characterize the private conduct as state action? At a
basic level, most versions of the state action doctrine already consider
both the government's degree of material interest-financial or
otherwise-and its level of control over the defendant.
The first prong of this proposed test asks whether, but for the
quasi-private entity, the state would step in to provide the service or
activity in question. As explained further below, this is one of the
functional concerns underlying the state action doctrine: a fear that
the state may be able to sidestep constitutional constraints by
delegating state activity to a private entity. 185 The three theories
described above attempt, albeit poorly, to define state activity in order
to prevent this technical means of escape. However, as will be
highlighted later, a but-for material interest inquiry has a more
coherent connection to the goals of the state action doctrine.
The second prong of the proposed framework focuses on control
and thus will serve as a backstop to any deficiencies in the material
interest prong. As a result, the two criteria are disjunctive. Control is
a functional expression of the doctrine, illustrated in cases such as

185. Delegation of purely state activity, as was the case in Terry v. Adams, is a good
example.
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Moose Lodge.186 The state's pervasive involvement with a private
entity-namely through regulation-may not satisfy a but-for inquiry,
but it nevertheless could significantly constrain the private entity in
question. The Court, faced with semi-private cases of racial
discrimination soon after the Second World War, concluded that it
needed to expand constitutional protections in these ambiguous
circumstances. 187 Hence, the control prong of the framework advocated
here recognizes that the government can play a constitutionally
meaningful role in the private sphere even when it would not replace
the private entity in its absence.
It is worth noting here that the framework posited in this Note
does not question the normative underpinnings of the state action
doctrine. Rather, it consolidates the categories and subcategories of
the current doctrine into a more consistent analysis by focusing on the
formal/functional tension that created those categories in the first
place.
B. What Degree of Material Interest?
The state action doctrine is essentially a question of degree.
Therefore, courts need a clear evidentiary standard to guide their
analysis in determining how much material interest or how much
control is sufficient to constitute state action. This is important
because, as highlighted in the previous Part, there is almost always
some degree of involvement between the state and the private entity.
Consequently, a litigant could reasonably dispute the presence or
absence of a material interest or control in any given case.
To determine whether the interest of the state in the private
entity is but-for material, a court should consider whether the state's
desired goal is being advanced through the private entity or whether
the state's involvement is a predominantly clerical decision
disconnected from an overarching objective. This question more
precisely focuses on whether a but-for material interest is present, and
hence, it is a better analytical approach to the state action inquiry.
186. In Moose Lodge, while it is reasonable to conclude that the state did not have a
"material" interest in issuing a liquor license to the lodge, the Court did invalidate a regulatory
provision that essentially controlled the private parties in their ability to allow non-white guests.
Supra text accompanying notes 89-94. It is also worth noting Shelly v. Kramer, where arguably,
the unstated rationale for the Court's finding of state action was based on the state's role in
effectively coercing or "controlling" private entities to be bound by a privately drawn restrictive
covenant because of the possibility of enforcement by the courts. See supra note 94.
187. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1258 (discussing "judicial
manipulation" of the doctrine as a result of concern that the formalist approach failed to address
"troubling instances of racial discrimination").
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For example, under the public function theory, a court must
ask whether an activity falls into the amorphous and ex post concept
of a "traditionally public" activity. The public function theory does not
consider ways in which the domains of public and private entities can
evolve and eventually overlap; moreover, the theory focuses on
generalized activities disconnected from the case at hand. The Court
analyzed the utilities in Jackson, for example, by looking into the
history of utilities in the United States-a generalized inquiry that
may not reflect the relationship between the state and a utility
company in a particular case. The but-for material interest prong, in
contrast, requires evidence of either a targeted approach or a clerical
decision in the case at hand. This mitigates a court's ability to cherrypick historical facts to construct a "public function" narrative for or
against state action.188

To illustrate the difference, consider the Court's application of
the public function theory in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, where a private
school that provided specialized education for troubled students was
almost entirely funded by the state and was the only one of its kind in
the school district. 189 The funding was clearly aimed at a specific
public service provided by state statute. 190 Hence, a private entity was
being used to advance a targeted public goal, which the school district
was unable or unwilling to offer itself.191 Yet despite the state's
material interest in the school, the Court applied the formalistic
public function test and merely relied on the fact that the "function
performed [by the school was not] . . . 'traditionally the exclusive

prerogative of the State.' "192 The Court overlooked pertinent facts
about the school's relationship with the state and left it free to
accomplish a legislative policy without any constitutional constraints.
As noted above, the potential for this kind of abuse was precisely one
188. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
189. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982).
190. Id. ("When students are referred to the school by Brookline or Boston under Chapter
766 of the Massachusetts Acts of 1972, the School Committees in those cities pay for the
students' education.").
191. To highlight just how unfocused the analysis can be from the underlying formal
rationale for state action, the Court in Rendell-Baker admits that the education of "maladjusted
high school students is a public function" based on the state statute, but then summarily goes on
to conclude that because the state had not "until recently" provided the educational service, the
legislative policy alone does not make those services "the exclusive province of the State." Id. at
842. Apart from the possible flaw in the logic of this argument, the Court fails to recognize that
previous ignorance of the legislative policy does not speak to whether the state may now be
sidestepping the constitutional risks-and its attendant costs-by simply delegating the matter
to a private entity. It is just this kind of potential for abuse that expanded the formal doctrine
into its functional categories in the first place.
192. Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
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of the underlying concerns of the state action doctrine as it evolved in
the twentieth century.
Similarly, the nexus theory looks into the degree of the state's
involvement with the private activity. However, while the nexus
theory is more specific than the public function theory, it remains
unclear what degree of involvement is sufficient to constitute state
action. To clarify, the nexus theory is incomplete because it does not
identify a threshold where involvement becomes so extensive that it
amounts to state action. The but-for material interest prong of the
standard set forth here draws such a line: it distinguishes targeted
goals from mere clerical decisions.
To illustrate this principle in a case relying on the nexus
theory, consider Blum v. Yaretsky. There, a private nursing home
received state funding for the costs of its facilities and the medical
expenses of ninety percent of its patients, and it faced penalties under
a regulation that sanctioned health care providers who offered
services "in excess of the beneficiary's needs." 193 This scenario
certainly seems to constitute a high level of state involvement, even if
the nursing homes retained some degree of medical judgment. 194
The but-for material interest prong would drill further down
into the real relationship between the state and the nursing home.
The state rules that determine the nursing home's funding could be
viewed as either a targeted goal or a clerical measure, depending on
the available evidence. For example, did the state enact the funding
rules as part of a statutory goal to provide nursing home services in
the state, or was it simply a clerical measure with little evidence that
the state would provide the services through some other avenue in the
absence of private compliance? Under this framework, the Court could
rely on the same factors it used to find the lack of a sufficient nexus1 95
between the state and the nursing home: for example, no statute
required the state to facilitate nursing home services, the regulations
were categorized as mere reporting requirements, the rules did not
give the state the authority to directly alter the nursing home's
medical judgments, and state officials merely "review[ed]" nursing
home reports to ensure proper levels of funding. 196 These factors
strongly indicate that the state has no but-for material interest in the
services provided by the nursing home, and hence it was unlikely that

193. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009-11 (1982).
194.
195.
arguably
196.

See supratext accompanying notes 83-88.
The Court evaluates state action under all three categories but uses factors that could
be analyzed in any one of them. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005-12.
Id.
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the state was formally abusing its constitutional obligations by
delegating to the private sphere. Although the conclusion is the same,
arriving at it through a single framework that emphasizes the
normative underpinnings of the state action doctrine offers a better
approach than the haphazard, fact-based standard that the Court
used in Blum.
Cases like Jackson would also come out the same way under
the framework proposed here. In Jackson, the Court highlighted
factors such as the absence of state investigation of the activity in
question, the mere approval of a practice initiated by the utility itself,
and the prevalence of the state's approval authority for even
uncontroversial activities.197 These factors show that the state in
Jackson likely did not have a but-for material interest in the private
utilities in question. Consequently, it is worth noting that the material
interest prong does not require courts to evaluate any information
that they do not already consider.
The but-for material interest prong is likewise superior to the
symbiotic relationship rationale under the joint participation theory.
The state and a private entity may often mutually benefit, financially
or otherwise, from state involvement. But that benefit may or may not
be incidental. The joint participation theory does not inform a court
whether the state is abusing its constitutional duties by delegating an
activity to a private entity instead of carrying it out on its own. Under
the material interest prong, a court would look to whether, if this
private activity did not exist, the state would find alternative means of
acquiring the same benefits. In Burton,s98 for example, the Court
would have looked for evidence showing that the state's leasing
program was essential to financing adequate parking facilities in the
city of Wilmington.199
C. What Degree of Control?
The second prong of the proposed test asks what degree of
control must be exercised by the state to constitute state action. The
court's analysis under this control prong should be based on whether
the claimant can exercise significant choice. By focusing on choice, this
prong attempts to place a meaningful limitation on the functional
aspect of the state action doctrine, which, as noted earlier, reflects a
197. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
198. See supratext accompanying notes 100-04.
199. Language in Burton suggests that this indeed might have been the case. Hence, again,
much of the evidentiary standards required for this prong is already evaluated by the courts,
albeit haphazardly. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 717-18 (1961).
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concern with governmental regulation occurring under the guise of
private action (particularly during the Civil Rights Era). The focus on
choice recognizes, as the courts have, that not all deprivations are
constitutionaldeprivations.
Choice is a common, albeit not universal, difference between an
individual's experiences with the state versus a private entity. For
example, when a private entity engages in discriminatory conduct, 200
the injured party usually has meaningful alternatives available (e.g.,
eating at a non-discriminatory restaurant). However, when an
individual is dealing with the state-applying for social security
benefits, for instance-there is often no other recourse available.
Thus, in most cases, the presence of a meaningful choice for the
claimant to avoid constitutional injury by a quasi-private entity
should serve as evidence that significant control-and thus state
action-is present.
In Rendell-Baker, the Court would apply this second prong by
focusing on the school's control over the dismissed teachers. It would
look to evidence showing that the relationship between the plaintiffs
and the quasi-private entity significantly limited the plaintiffs' ability
to seek alternative means of redress-in this case, finding new
employment. While the facts on this point are unclear from the Court's
opinion, it is unlikely that the claimants were so constrained in their
employment options that they lacked a meaningful choice. 20 1
Employees of quasi-private entities are not state employees, and they
typically have employment alternatives available. This stands in
contrast to the electoral process in Terry v. Adams, an activity where
the state has a monopoly-just the type of state imprimatur that the
Court has long considered state action.
Finally, Brentwood Academy would have also been decided the
same way under the control prong of the framework proposed here.
There was probably evidence showing that the athletic association was
so pervasive that a school had to be a member to remain a competitive
choice for parents and students. Thus, the presence of this degree of
state control would have likely provided enough evidence that the
association should be considered a state actor.

200. Presuming it is not illegal under federal or state law.
201. Note that this consideration, whether sufficient control to find state action is present, is
similar to the Court's analysis in determining whether a liberty interest sufficient to implicate
the Due Process Clause should be found. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)
("[Tihere is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on
him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.").
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As noted above, the second control prong maintains the balance
between the two main concerns that have historically supported the
state action doctrine. Prior to the 1960s, the doctrine was largely a
formal one, drawing bright lines based on the state's intentions and
actions. 202 However, as claimants began to suffer seemingly public
injuries in private settings, 203 the state action doctrine was broadened
to take these circumstances into account. 204
While the first prong of the proposed framework is focused on
the interests of the state, the second prong looks to the concerns of the
claimant. The formalist rationale for the doctrine was grounded in the
need to preserve the liberty interests of private entities in avoiding
constitutional regulation. "Liberty" in this sense means a private
actor's ability to freely move and develop within a social and economic
sphere. 205 The instrumentalist approach, on the other hand, was born
out of a direct concern for the claimant, placing greater emphasis on
the impact of private action that looked very much like unofficial state
action. 206 Racial discrimination was the primary catalyst for this
shift. 207 The second prong of the framework advocated here accounts
for both of these concerns by placing the emphasis on the absence or
presence of meaningful choice, the essence of liberty itself.
Of course, before the second prong can be applied, there must
be some state involvement in the affairs of a quasi-private entity.
Thus, these prongs are applied where they are most needed, in the
difficult cases where the private entity is not a clear candidate for
state actor status.

202. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1256-58 (discussing "classical legal
thought" and its prominence in the Civil Rights Cases).
203. The White Primary Cases were a response to a series of attempts by the state of Texas
to avoid constitutional constraints on its electoral process by increasingly delegating to private
parties its discriminatory goals. The Court presumably evolved the doctrine to a more functional

analysis-through the public function theory-out of a concern for stamping out racial
discrimination in the electoral process. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 535-37 (explaining
that in these cases the Court concluded that elections, even when run by private political clubs,
were essentially public functions).
204. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1258-59 (explaining that mid-twentieth
century "social legal thought," recognized social interdependence and a more instrumentalist
view of law).
205. I will not get into the larger philosophical implications of what may or may not
constitute "liberty" in the individual or social context.
206. See Developments in the Law, supra note 26, at 1259 (discussing how the
instrumentalist approach responded to the need to fill in gaps in positive law that permitted
racism).
207. Id. at 1258 (noting that the seminal work on social legal thought acknowledged the
eradication of racism as the greatest priority of the U.S. legal system).
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D. Limitations of the ProposedFramework
To be sure, this framework is still fact dependent. It may not
give tremendous guidance to future fact patterns without clear
evidence of material interest or control. The nuances of each new case
may intuitively push a court in one direction or the other, a
phenomenon that has occurred time and again in previous state action
cases. Indeed, singular frameworks like the one introduced here have
been applied in other areas of constitutional law. Constitutional
standing doctrine, for example, must be applied to a wide range of
factual conditions but it is still guided by a consistent three-factor test:
injury, causation, and redressability. Nevertheless, many scholars
would argue that the seemingly consistent standing doctrine is
anything but. 208 There is no guarantee that the historical and
ideological tensions that influence courts would not similarly warp the
framework introduced here.
Nevertheless, even if judges feel compelled to emphasize
certain facts to reach predetermined conclusions about state action, a
universal framework forces them to better explain apparent
deviations. At the very least, then, this framework will discipline
courts to conduct a meaningful state action analysis-rather than
simply picking a theory and running with it 209-and arrive at more
transparent outcomes in the process. Moreover, like standing doctrine,
scholars may be able to better critique state action decisions by
focusing on a court's reasons for deviating from the singular
framework. At present, scholarly criticism of state action cases is
limited because it is often not clear why courts emphasize certain
factors over others.
Finally, the singular framework proposed here might be easier
for the government to circumvent. With respect to material interest,
legislators may become silent about the importance of a particular
endeavor or even employ rhetoric to suggest its "clerical" nature.
While this is a possibility, legislators and administrators would have
to be willing to forgo the political benefits of touting materially
important public initiatives-exactly what the material interest prong
intends to capture-for the mere possibility of circumventing the state
action doctrine in some future litigation. With respect to control, this
inquiry looks to the options available to the private entity. If the state

208. See e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988)
(discussing the "apparentlawlessness ... [and] the wildly vacillating results" of standing cases).

209. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36 (describing instances in which courts have
skimmed over a state action analysis).
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wished to improve the availability of alternatives in order to minimize
evidence of its control, then the inquiry should lead to the conclusion
that no state action exists.
E. Applying the New Framework to FINRA
1. Material Interest
The proposed framework should constrain a court's analysis
and make it considerably easier to apply the doctrine to FINRA. An
analysis of but-for material interest should investigate the net
accumulation of the government's interest in FINRA's affairs. With a
long history of increasing congressional involvement, the
accumulation of government activity provides a fairly good indication
of whether the state has a material interest with respect to FINRA.
Given the extensive history relayed above, it becomes fairly
apparent that the state has a significant interest in regulating the
securities industry. The government's increased involvement in the
securities market, for example, has outpaced the general escalation in
economic regulation. Congress and the SEC have intentionally sought
to adopt, affirm, and fine-tune the SRO model as a means to curb
specific abuses in the securities market in the 1930s, 2 10 1970s, 211

1980s, 212 1990s, 213 and 2000s. 214 While the explanations of Congress or
SEC Commissioners are not dispositive in determining whether the
government has a material interest,215 the government has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of robust regulation of the securities
market and the belief that the SRO model should be the primary
mechanism for doing it.216
210. The OTC market's role in the period leading up to the Great Depression. See Friedman,
supra note 18, at 738-39 (describing the extension of government supervision over the selfregulating NYSE and NASD).
211. The abuses were discovered through the only major independent study of the securities
market since the 1930s. See Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Joint
Securities Conference 1975, at 2-3 (Nov. 18, 1975), available at http://perma.cc/5WXF-YQUF
(laying out the events that culminated in the crisis of 1968-1971 and the ensuing legislation).
212. The absence of universal membership and compliance. See supra text accompanying
note 129.
213. Karmel, supra note 36, at 16 ("The NASD was completely reorganized in 1996 in the
wake of a Department of Justice and SEC investigation into anti-competitive practices by OTC
market makers.").
214. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as the post-Enron response to widespread abuses. Id.
at 5.
215. This would just offer an incentive to remain silent about intent.
216. See SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107 (explaining the
reasons for which Congress has historically favored self-regulation of the securities industry).
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The government also has a material monetary interest in using
the SRO model. Not only are firms required to be members of FINRA,
but they must also fund it.217 This scheme results in significant
savings for the SEC. 2 18 The Commission can thus choose to devote its
resources elsewhere.
The extent of the SEC's material interest means that FINRA
satisfies the but-for element of the first prong. Every historical
indication suggests that in the absence of an SRO such as FINRA, the
government would regulate the securities market directly. 219 The SEC
would devote its resources to the same investigatory and enforcement
activities currently relegated to FINRA. 220
2. Control
Technically, the proposed framework would end with a finding
of material interest. Nevertheless, it is worth applying the second
prong as well to determine whether significant control, from the
perspective of the member firm, is present. At the very least, a
showing of control would simply bolster a court's finding of state
action.
Again, the applicable regulatory structure significantly
constrains FINRA members. FINRA exerts meaningful control over its
private members, given the statutory requirement for membership, its
role as investigator, and its enforcement powers to levy fines and bar
firms from practice. While members do enjoy some form of procedural
review with the SEC and federal courts for FINRA's enforcement
actions against them, it can hardly be argued that this significantly
limits FINRA's level of control. This is because aside from member
input in the rulemaking process, FINRA's regulations-through which
enforcement actions are taken-are ultimately approved by FINRA
and the SEC (not, for example, by a majority vote of FINRA's
members).221

As such, given the presence of both material interest and
control, a court should classify FINRA as a state actor under the
217. Id.

218. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (discussing the large staff and budget
available to the NASD and NYSE as SROs).
219. See SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, supra note 107 (discussing the
historical development of the extension of federal regulation over SROs in the investment
industry).
220. Id.

221. See Karmel, supra note 36, at 17-18 (noting that greater "autonomy and independence"
of NASD staff was required during the 1996 reorganization and explaining that, as part of a
settlement, the SEC required NASD to have a majority of non-industry members on its board).
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framework articulated in this Note. Then, when a claimant asserts
that FINRA violated the Due Process Clause, for example, courts
could move away from the threshold state action question to the
substantive question of how the Constitution should be applied in this
quasi-private context. 222
VI. CONCLUSION

The primary role of the state action doctrine is to create a
meaningful public/private distinction in order to balance the risk of
overextending constitutional constraints into the private sphere with
the potential for abuse when the line between state and private
activity blurs. The doctrine has developed in such a way, however,
that consistent application has become nearly impossible. Analyzing
FINRA illustrates this point because the leading theories can be
reasonably manipulated to produce any result. Moreover, prior
precedents have not been useful to courts trying to analyze unique
forms of private activity. The circuits have split over whether to
subject FINRA to constitutional constraints.
Consequently, in response to what many commentators see as
a haphazard application of the doctrine by the courts, most state
action scholarship advocates overhauling or abandoning the doctrine
altogether. This Note, however, has taken a different approach. The
framework proposed here is distilled from the theoretical and practical
concerns that have characterized the state action doctrine since its
origination in the Civil Rights Cases. Its goal is to constrain the state
action doctrine into a reasonably predictable analytical inquiry.
The success of any framework depends on its ability to be
consistently applied across a wide range of factual circumstances, both
old and new. Part V of this Note tested the solution advocated here
against some of the leading state action cases and against the
difficulties proposed by FINRA-a public/private entity unlike any
other considered by the Supreme Court. While this new framework
cannot entirely eliminate the need for analogous reasoning when the
state creates increasingly novel ways to involve itself with the private
sector, its application to FINRA shows that it can mitigate the most
freewheeling aspects of the current doctrine. This proposed framework

222. In other words, instead of asking whether constitutional process is due, the court
should be analyzing just how much process is due.
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would go a long way toward clearing up the morass that the state
action doctrine has become.
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